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PREVIEW; Murray v. BEJ Minerals: Digging Up the Truth on
Whether the Possessory Right of Dinosaur Fossils Lie with a Parcel’s
Mineral Interest or Surface Interest.
Kylar Clifton*
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in this matter
on Thursday, November 7, 2019, at 9:30 a.m., in the Courtroom of the
Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, Helena,
Montana. Eric B. Wolff will likely appear on behalf of the Appellants.
Harlan B. Krogh will likely appear on behalf of the Appellees.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc in
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, to determine whether dinosaur fossils are
part of the surface or mineral estate under Montana law.1 Finding state
law determinative and no controlling precedent, the Ninth Circuit
certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court. This question asks
the Court to determine: Whether, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils
constitute “minerals” for the purpose of a mineral reservation?
This question presents the Court with the issue of determining
whether dinosaur fossils are “minerals” for the purpose of a mineral
reservations in a deed between private parties in Montana. During the
2019 Legislative Session, the Montana State Legislature passed
legislation establishing that fossils are not “minerals” for the purpose of a
mineral rights reservation.2 Here, however, the Court has the opportunity
to articulate a test that will affect not only the dinosaurs fossils in this
matter, but also principles of contract interpretation and the relationship
between the judiciary and the legislature.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

George Severson previously owned a farm and ranch property
including both the surface and mineral estate (“the Ranch”) located in
Garfield County, Montana. George Severson has leased the Ranch to
Mary Ann and Lige Murray (collectively the “Murrays”) since 1983.3
From approximately 1991 until 2005, George Severson transferred
portions of his property interest to his two sons, Jerry and Robert
(collectively the “Seversons”). The property interest still retained by the
Seversons has been transferred to BEJ Minerals, LLC, and RTWF, LLC.4
In 2005, after of the surface and mineral estates were severed, George
* Kylar Clifton, Candidate for J.D. 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana.
1
920 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
2
H.B. 229, 66th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019) (codified as MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4112).
3
Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1204 (D. Mont. 2016).
4
Id. at 1205.
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Severson sold the remainder of his interest to the Murrays.5 Until 2005,
the Seversons and the Murrays jointly owned and operated the Ranch.6
Subsequently, the Seversons sold their entire surface estate rights and
one-third of their mineral estate rights to the Murrays.7 The mineral deed
executed and recorded by both parties during the sale stated that both
parties would remain tenants in common to “all right title and interest in
and to all of the oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under,
and that may be produced” from the Ranch.8 At the time the parties
executed the sale of the surface estate, neither the Seversons nor the
Murrays suspected dinosaur fossils existed on the Ranch.9
After the severance and conveyance of the mineral and surface
estates, the Murrays discovered several valuable dinosaur fossils
(collectively the “Fossils”) on the Ranch.10 One of the discoveries
included a pair of interlocked dinosaurs nicknamed “the Dueling
Dinosaurs.”11 The Dueling Dinosaurs were appraised to have a market
value of seven to nine million dollars.12 Additionally, the fossilized
remains of a Tyrannosaurus rex was discovered in 2013 and the Murrays
have already sold this theropod to a Dutch museum for millions of
dollars with the proceeds held in escrow pending the resolution of this
litigation.13 The Murrays claim that they first notified the Seversons of
the initial discoveries in 200814, however, this fact is disputed.
The Murrays filed a complaint in the Sixteenth Judicial District
Court of Montana seeking a declaratory judgment that the they are the
rightful owners of the Fossils under Montana law because fossils are part
of the surface estate.15 The Seversons removed the case to federal court
on the basis of diversity and counterclaimed that the Fossils were part of
the mineral estate.16 The Seversons assert that the Fossils are “minerals”
under Montana law, and, as such, they are entitled to part of the proceeds
from the sale of the Fossils.17
The United States District Court for the District of Montana,
Billings Division, presided over the case and held that dinosaur fossils
are not “minerals” for the purposes of a mineral reservation under
Montana law.18 The Seversons appealed the judgement to the Ninth
Circuit.19 A majority of a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed
the decision in favor of the Seversons, holding that the dinosaur fossils

5

Id.
Id.
7
Id.
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Id.
9
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
13
Id.
14
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2019).
15
Id.
16
Murray, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.
17
Murray, 924 F.3d at 1073.
18
Murray, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1212.
19
Murray, 924 F.3d at 1073.
6
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are “minerals.”20 However, this holding by the Ninth Circuit panel is
non-precedential.21 The Murrays requested a rehearing en banc.22 A
majority vote of the active non-recused judges of the Ninth Circuit
granted the request for an en banc hearing23 and stayed proceedings
pending a determination by the Court whether the Fossils are part of the
surface or mineral estate for the purposes of a mineral reservation under
Montana law.24
The Court accepted the certified question on June 4, 2019.25 In
accordance with the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court
may reformulate the question pending full consideration of the issue.26
Here, the Court may take this opportunity to articulate whether or not
fossils should be part of the mineral or surface estate of a property
regardless of what the Montana State Legislature determined last session,
or the Court may choose to focus on the contractual agreement between
the two parties and leave the legislative determination untouched.
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Appellants’ Arguments

The Seversons contend that the Ninth Circuit was correct in
determining that the Fossils discovered on the Ranch are categorized as
“minerals.”27 The Seversons assert that due to the value and rareness of
the Fossils, the Court should determine that the Fossils are “minerals”
and order that the proceeds from the sale of the Fossils be split according
to the division of mineral rights under the deed executed by the parties.28
The Seversons assert that the Court should follow the test announced in
Farley v. Booth Brothers Land and Livestock Company29, and refined in
Hart v. Craig 30, to determine that the Fossils are “minerals” for the
purpose of a mineral reservation.
In Farley, the Court noted that the term “mineral” has been difficult
for the courts to define and the statutory definitions available are
inconsistent.31 The Court held that for a naturally occurring substance to
be considered a “mineral” for the purpose of a mineral reservation the
substance must have a particular property giving it special value beyond
being used for roadbuilding.32

20

Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437, 448 (9th Cir. 2019).
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 920 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2019).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Murray, 924 F.3d at 1074.
25
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 2383604 at *1 (Mont. June 4, 2019) (No. 16-5506).
26
Mont. R. App. P. 15(6)(a)(iii).
27
Brief of Appellants, Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 4238239 at *1–2 (Mont. July 2,
2019) (No. OP 19-0304).
28
Id.
29
890 P.2d 377 (Mont. 1995).
30
216 P.3d 197 (Mont. 2009).
31
Farley, 890 P.2d at 379–381.
32
Id. at 380.
21
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The Court adopted this test from the Texas Supreme Court decision
in Heinatz v. Allen.33 In Heinatz, the Texas Supreme Court was tasked
with determining if limestone was part of the surface or mineral estate
for a parcel of land.34 The Heinatz, decision held that materials which are
only of use in road building are not considered minerals.35 The Texas
Supreme Court held in Heinatz that “substances such as sand, gravel and
limestone are not minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of
the word unless they are rare and exceptional in character or possess a
peculiar property giving them special value.”36 While this language may
suggest, as the Seversons desire, that substances with rare and
exceptional value are minerals, the Texas Supreme Court then goes on to
highlight the production value of substances when they are used to
“mak[e] glass” or “manufactured into cement.”37 The Texas Supreme
Court stated that because the limestone was not rare or exceptional in
value and was closely related to the soil it could not be considered part of
the mineral estate and was, therefore, part of the surface estate.38
In Farley, the Court determined that even though scoria was used to
construct roadways that does not make it valuable and exceptional in
character and therefore is not a mineral.39 In Hart, the Court extended
their holding in Farley to a dispute over whether sandstone was a part of
a conveyed mineral reservation.40 The Court relied upon Heinatz and
ruled that substances such as sandstone are not considered a “mineral”
unless they are: (1) rare and exceptional in character; or (2) possess a
peculiar property giving them special value.41 The Court emphasized in
Hart that sandstone is not considered rare or exceptional simply because
it can be sold commercially.42
Here, the Seversons urge the Court to focus solely on the Fossils at
issue here, which would provide the most equitable result.43 The
Seversons ask the Court to adopt the same interpretation that they did in
Farley and Hart which provides a substance is a mineral if it: (1) is
comprised of mineral substances; and (2) is rare and exceptional in
character or it has a peculiar property giving it special value.44 The
Seversons contend that because the Fossils are rare and valuable, they
should be categorized as minerals,” and therefore should be part of the
mineral estate.45 The Seversons assert that in Farley and subsequently in
Hart, the Court did not rely on the statutory definitions of the term
“minerals” and determined that the definitions were of little significance

33

217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1949).
Id. at 998.
35
Id. at 997.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197, 198 (Mont. 2009).
41
Id. at 211.
42
Id.
43
Appellant Br., supra note 27, at *21–22.
44
Id. at *12.
45
Id. at *20.
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due to the multitude of ways the word mineral can and has been
defined.46
B.

Appellees’ Arguments

The Murrays, contend that the Court should adopt the ruling of the
district court and conclude that the Fossils are part of the surface estate
of the Ranch.47 The Murrays argue that if the Court were to conclude that
fossils are indeed part of the mineral estate relying on the Farley test,
then other courts will be burdened by having to conduct a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether fossils disputed in future litigation are rare
and valuable.48 Further, the Murrays dispute the holding in Farley and
contend that it did not develop a test that allows for a substance to be
classified as a mineral if it is exceptionally rare and valuable.49 The
Murrays contend that in Farley the Court first looked to the statutory
definitions of the term “mineral” and then assessed whether the
substance in dispute was of exceptional character.50 The Murrays
contend that the rare and valuable test articulated in Farley only applies
if the substance in dispute is not contemplated in the statutory definition
of the term mineral.51 Since fossils are not defined in any statutory
definition of the term mineral, the Court cannot move on to the rare and
valuable analysis of Farley.52
Additionally, the Murrays ask the Court to heed the will of the
Montana State Legislature which, while this litigation was pending,
adopted a new provision to the Montana Code providing that fossils are
not minerals..53 The Murrays additionally argue that since the contract in
which the mineral and surface estates were conveyed did not explicitly
contemplate fossils the Court should not construe the mineral reservation
to include fossils.54
IV.

ANALYSIS

Defining what constitutes a mineral has not been extensively
addressed under Montana law, and whether a fossil is a “mineral” has
never been specifically addressed by the Court. The limited Montana
case law available, Farley and Hart, which attempted to develop a test
for the lower courts to apply in classifying minerals were discussed at
length by both parties. The statutory definitions of the word “mineral”
under Montana law are contradictory and misleading when employed out
of context such as with the question currently before the Court.55 The
Court even acknowledged the contradictory nature of the term in Farley
46

Farley v. Booth Brothers Land and Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 379 (Mont. 1995).
Brief of Appellees, Murrays v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 4238240 at *1–3 (Mont. July 31,
2019) (No. OP 19-0304).
48
Id. at *2.
49
Id. at *12.
50
Id. at *11–12.
51
Id. at *17.
52
Id.
53
Id. at *3.
54
Id. at *10–12.
55
Id. at *12.
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and pointed out that under Title 82, Chapter 4 gravel is a “mineral” in
one provision and not a “mineral” in another.56
The term “mineral” is discussed in three different provisions of the
Montana Code Annotated. In Title 82, Minerals, Oil, and Gas, minerals
include any:
ore, rock, or substance, other than oil, gas, bentonite, clay, coal,
sand, gravel, peat, soil materials, or uranium, that is taken from
below the surface or from the surface of the earth for the purpose
of milling, concentration, refinement, smelting, manufacturing, or
other subsequent use or processing or for stockpiling for future
use, refinement, or smelting.57
This definition provides little guidance to the question presented because
fossils are not used in milling, concentration, refinement, smelting or any
other defined form of processing.
Additionally, under Title 70, Property, mineral means “gas; oil;
coal; other gaseous, liquid, and solid hydrocarbons; oil shale; cement
material; sand and gravel; road material; building stone; chemical raw
material; gemstone; fissionable and nonfissionable ores; colloidal and
other clay; steam and other geothermal resource.”58 Just as in Title 82
this definition does not include any reference to fossils or any text that
would necessarily encompass fossils.
Finally, in Title 15, Taxation, mineral is defined as “any precious
stones or gems, gold, silver, copper, coal, lead, petroleum, natural gas,
oil, uranium, talc, vermiculite, limestone, or other nonrenewable
merchantable products extracted from the surface or subsurface of the
state of Montana.”59 This provision specifically distinguishes precious
substances that have value as minerals, but does not include any
reference to fossils. The Court has found little value in statutory
interpretations of a mineral and in Farley it stated that “the definition of
‘mineral’ can differ according to the context in which it is used.”60 Here,
the Court should follow their decision in Farley and not rely on statutory
definitions to resolve this matter.61
While an equitable solution would include the Fossils in the mineral
estate of the Ranch, since both parties have a portion of the mineral
rights, the Court may choose to allow the will of the Montana State
Legislature to dictate the outcome of this matter. In 2019, the Montana
State Legislature passed House Bill 229, which specifically states that
fossils are not minerals and are part of the surface estate of land.62
Section 8 of House Bill 229 states that the act and its provisions within
56

Farley v. Booth Brothers Land and Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 379 (Mont. 1995).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-303 (2019).
58
Id. § 70-9-802.
59
Id. § 15-38-103.
60
Farley, 890 P.2d at 379.
61
Id.
62
H.B. 229, 66th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019).
57

2019

Preview: Murray v. BEJ Minerals

51

apply retroactively to instruments that sever the mineral estate from the
surface estate of a parcel of property.63 However, Section 5, carved out
this matter from its application. Section 5 states that H.B. 229 does not
affect proceedings that began before its passage.64 Since H.B. 229 cannot
dictate the outcome of this matter by virtue of its passage, the Murrays
request that the Court at least consider the message communicated by its
passage.65 This request, however, would obscure the separation of
powers afforded to both the judicial and legislative branches inMontana.
While H.B. 229, will determine the outcome of future fossil disputes, the
Court has the authority to determine the fate of the Fossils discovered on
the Ranch.
Since current statutory definitions and the newly enacted statute do
not conclusively resolve the issue here, the Court will likely look to its
prior holdings in Farley and Hart. In Farley, the Court determined that
scoria could not easily be included in the statutory definition of
“mineral” under Title 82.66 In its holding, the Court discussed how scoria
is used for building roadways and the gains value after being processed.67
Even though its rare and exceptional value was asserted by one of the
parties in Farley, the Court did not rest its holding on that assertation.68
Instead, the Court only noted that scoria is only useful for building and
road-making purposes and therefore is not a mineral.69 This denotation is
particularly important to the dispute between the Murrays and the
Seversons because the Court in Farley focused its analysis on the
production and processing potential of scoria not on its intrinsic value.
The only other instance where the Court addressed the definition of
a mineral was in Hart. In Hart, the Court briefly addressed the intrinsic
value of the material in question and concluded that sandstone was not
exceptionally rare or valuable.70 In Hart, the Court again turned to
Heinatz in assessing whether sandstone constitutes a mineral with
regards to a mineral rights reservation.71 The Court concluded that
sandstone is not rare and has no exceptional value when used for
landscaping purposes.72 As with Farley, the Court here focused on the
production and processing value of the material in question and did not
discuss its stand-alone intrinsic value. Accordingly, in this matter the
Court is faced with a new issue that may fall outside the scope of Farley
and Hart.
Although the precise issue presented here has not previously been
considered, the Court should extend the well-reasoned logic of Farley
and Hart to resolve this case. First, the Court should look to see if the
63

Id.
Id.
65
Appellee Br., supra note 47, at *35.
66
Farley, 890 P.2d at 379.
67
Id. at 380.
68
Farley, 890 P.2d at 380 (quoting Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549, 550–51 (Okla. 1975)).
69
Id.
70
Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197, 198 (Mont. 2009).
71
Id.
72
Id.
64

52

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 80

Fossils are rare and exceptional in character. If the Court finds that the
Fossils are rare and exceptional in character than they should be
considered part of the mineral estate. However, if the Court does not find
them to be rare and exceptional in character the Court should then see if
they possess any peculiar property giving them special value for a
production or processing purpose. Here, the Court should not have to go
beyond the first part of the test. The Fossils discovered on the Ranch are
not useful for road construction or other production purposes, but they
are still rare and exceptional on their own as evidenced by their market
value. The Court is likely to rule in contradiction of Montana Code
Annotated § 1-4-112 in this matter and find that the Fossils in question
here are “minerals” because they are rare and exceptional in character.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite all prior case law discussing the processing value of various
mineral substances, the Court will likely look to its established precedent
and determine that the Fossils on the Ranch are part of the mineral estate.
While this ruling will not impact other future fossil discoveries due to
subsequent legislative enactments, it will have significant monetary
effects on the Murrays and the Seversons. The Court will likely hold that
the Fossils are rare and exceptional in character because they are
distinguishable from the materials discussed in Farley and Hart and
therefore should be categorized as minerals.

